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The Remembrance Ritual of “Beskozyrka”  
in novorossiisk1
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The battle to free the strategic Soviet Black Sea port of novorossiisk from 
German occupation during the Great Patriotic War in 1943 was successfully 
fought from the beach‑head of malaia zemlia, held by Soviet landing troops, 
including the young Leonid Il´ich Brezhnev. Thanks to the publication of 
Brezhnev’s over‑inlated memoir malaia zemlia,4 the campaign and Brezhnev’s 
part in it became renowned in the Soviet Union while derided as insigniicant 
1. I am pleased to acknowledge the helpful comments of the CmR editors and anonymous 
reviewers; and the advice of my supervisors, Kristin Roth‑ey and Sarah Young, 
UCL‑SSeeS.
2. “So many fearless young sailors in pea‑jackets and caps perished in the deep. So many times 
we saw dead sailors´ caps floating on the sea.” Georgii Sokolov, my s maloi zemli [We are 
from malaia zemlia] (m.: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1979), 367‑368.
3. “Lay wreaths on the waves./This is society´s custom:/in memory of soldiers who died at sea,/
wreaths are laid on the waves.” excerpt from Andrei Voznesenskii, “Rekviem” (1975): Andrei 
Voznesenskii: Sobranie sochinenii v trëkh tomakh [Andrei Voznesenskii: Collected Works in Three Volumes], Vol. 2 (M.: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1984), 269.
4. Leonid Il´ich Brezhnev, “malaia zemlia,” in malaia zemlia: Vozrozhdenie [malaia zemlia: 
Regeneration] (m.: Prosveshchenie, 1979), 1‑95 (first published in 1978).
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by dissident and Western scholars.5 If the world and the rest of the Soviet Union 
virtually forgot this so‑called minor battle after Brezhnev’s death, its memory was 
retained in novorossiisk. The unique remembrance ritual of “Beskozyrka” (a sailor’s 
cap), invented in novorossiisk in 1968, has increased in scale and scope over the 
last decade, maintaining the war myth locally and further aield. This analysis of the 
Beskozyrka tradition provides a case study of a provincial ceremony of remembrance 
started during the war cult of the Brezhnev era and now thriving under the inluence 
of a second war cult under President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. This article will 
examine the role of young people in the invention and development of the tradition, 
while establishing the reasons for its success in promoting the intergenerational 
transmission of war memory in novorossiisk from the early Brezhnev era to today.
map of the novorossiisk landings, 4th February 19436
 As part of my doctoral project on war memory in novorossiisk, research on the 
history of Beskozyrka and current attitudes towards the tradition was carried out 
5. For example: Zhores medvedev, Andropov (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 101; and nina 
Tumarkin, moscow´s War memorial: The Story of a national Symbol (Wellesley, mA: 
Wellesley College, 1988), 50.
6. Reproduced with the permission of novorossiiskii istoricheskii muzei‑zapovednik.
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during three trips to novorossiisk between 2010 and 2013, with personal observation 
of the 2013 ceremony. The article builds on evidence from novorossiisk museum 
archives; local newspaper articles; the published works of Konstantin Podyma, 
the main instigator of Beskozyrka; and a series of personal interviews with a 
cross‑section of novorossiisk residents.7
Hats off to Heroes: A Tribute from the Young People of novorossiisk
According to the “invention of tradition” approach to the study of collective memory, 
developed by eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger,8 commemoration is usually 
orchestrated by the state and the élite with little dissent, any bottom‑up approaches 
normally reinforcing top‑down collective memory, and with the emphasis largely 
on unity of remembrance rather than a plurality of voices. Basing his arguments on 
remembrance through social practice,9 Hobsbawm claims that ritualistic traditions 
are often invented by governments seeking legitimization, establishing social 
cohesion by an implied continuity with the past and inculcating through repetition 
certain behavioural norms and moral values deemed to be desirable in society. 
The functional approach of Hobsbawm, like that of emile Durkheim and maurice 
Halbwachs before him,10 may allow for some small agreed revision of memory, 
but emphasizes rather the solidarity of society in its collective memory. Indeed, 
any potential binary opposition of national and local remembrance, oficial and 
vernacular interpretation, could serve to undermine political and national solidarity. 
Supericially Hobsbawm’s approach may seem to offer a useful paradigm in 
the case of the centralized Soviet Union, but in fact the Beskozyrka ritual was 
invented not by the national élite, but by a small group of young local people, 
albeit no doubt under the inluence of the state’s burgeoning war cult. Within a 
year of Brezhnev’s appointment as General Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he had re‑instated the Victory Day 
7. 124 local citizens aged from 18 to 93 were interviewed between may 2010 and February 
2013, with further evidence collected by email correspondence. 55.3% of the interviewees 
were women and 44.7% men. Interviewees, including Konstantin Podyma, teachers and 
lecturers, students, war veterans, housewives, historians, librarians, town councillors and 
journalists, were invited to discussions loosely structured around a series of questions in their 
workplace, at home or on neutral territory. UCL ethical approval was obtained for the project 
and confidentiality of respondents was guaranteed, although some experts agreed to waive this 
right. Anonymous interviewees are identified using the format “F (female) or m (male)/first 
digit of age/identifying letter”; the date of the relevant interview follows in brackets.
8. eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983).
9. Ibid.
10. emile Durkheim, moral education, trans. E.K.  Wilson (New York: Free Press, 1961) 
(first published 1925); emile Durkheim, The elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Karen E. Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995) (first published 1912); Maurice Halbwachs, 
On Collective memory, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago, IL – London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992) (first published 1925).
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memorial ceremony on moscow’s Red Square for the twentieth anniversary of 
the end of the war in 1965. Television increasingly brought war memory to the 
masses with the series Vyzyvaem ogon´ na sebia and Podvig both broadcast 
in  1965.11 
The change in state policy to promote war memory was anticipated in 
novorossiisk in 1963, when the local Communist Party newspaper, novorossiiskii 
rabochii, illed a whole page with war memories,12 while the irst reunion of 
“malozemel´tsy” (troops who served on malaia zemlia) took place on the 
twentieth anniversary of the successful culmination of the campaign.13 In 1965, 
the same paper was exceptionally published on a Sunday, devoting its whole 
four‑page edition to the revived Victory Day celebrations. One by‑product of the 
growing war cult, attributed by nina Tumarkin to the state’s wish to “mobilize 
loyalty [and] maintain order,”14 was the increase in status of Brezhnev by virtue of 
his military service and of novorossiisk thanks to its association with Brezhnev. 
In an exercise of mutual self‑promotion, Brezhnev awarded novorossiisk the 
Order of the Great Patriotic War in may 1966. The increased momentum of the 
war cult enabled the relaxation of some restrictions on literary output, such that 
the irst major Malaia zemlia war memoir appeared in 1967, authored by Georgii 
Vladimirovich Sokolov.15 
With this build‑up of the memorial climate nationally and locally during the 
mid‑1960s, the time was ripe for a new form of commemoration in novorossiisk. In 
January 1968, a ten‑line paragraph appeared in the youth section of novorossiiskii 
rabochii, advertising “Operatsiia ‘Beskozyrka’” [The “Beskozyrka” Operation], a 
procession carrying the “torch of glory,” lit from the eternal Flame on Ploshchad´ 
Geroev [Heroes’ Square] to the site of the malaia zemlia landings in the small 
hours of 4th February, in commemoration of the twenty‑ifth anniversary of the 
start of the battle.16 
The youth movement promoted by novorossiiskii rabochii was inspired by 
the creation in 1962 of a club for young readers by Komsomol´skaia Pravda,17 
the oficial organ of the Communist youth movement, the Komsomol. The 
novorossiisk offshoot of the readers’ club, named Shkhuna rovesnikov, 
11. S. Kolosovii, Vyzyvaem ogon´ na sebia [We draw fire on ourselves] (USSR: mossfil´m, 
1964‑1965); Podvig [The exploit] (USSR: Tsentral´noe televidenie SSSR, 1965). 
12. Captain m. Shiriamov, “Zavtra ‑ Prazdnik Pobedy [Tomorrow is Victory Day],” 
novorossiiskii rabochii (8 may 1963), 2.
13. Georgii Sokolov, malaia zemlia: Rasskazy i ocherki [malaia zemlia: Stories and essays] 
(Krasnodar: Krasnodarskoe knizhnoe izdatel´stvo, 1967), 383.
14. nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in 
Russia (new York: BasicBooks, 1994), 133‑134.
15. Sokolov, malaia zemlia: Rasskazy i ocherki.
16. “Operatsiia ‘Beskozyrka’ [The ‘Beskozyrka’ Ceremony],” novorossiiskii rabochii, (12 Jan. 1968), 4.
17. Konstantin Podyma, “Vechnyi ogon´  ”: ty gori, ne sgorai… [“eternal Flame”: You are burning, never go out…] (M.: Pilotnoe izdanie, 2008), 8.
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encouraged its teenage members (Shkhunatiki) to form the land‑based crew of an 
imaginary schooner, incorporating a system of ranks, an oath of adherence and 
passwords for meetings. The founding captain and self‑proclaimed helmsman 
of the Shkhuna rovesnikov was the novice novorossiiskii rabochii journalist, 
Konstantin Ivanovich Podyma.18 Gathering his crew in november 1965, he 
invited all “romantics” and “fantasists” to set sail with him on a journey of 
dreams, discussion and self‑discovery.19 Thus started the weekly meetings in 
their “cabin” in the novorossiiskii rabochii ofices,20 leading to the proposal to 
mark the anniversary of the landings in 1968. The idea was to commemorate 
unburied troops who had died at sea by carrying a sailor’s peakless uniform cap 
(the eponymous “beskozyrka”) four kilometres through the streets of the town 
just after midnight. The hat would then be ceremonially lowered into the sea at 
Malaia zemlia, surrounded by wreaths of lowers. 
This ceremony is possibly a relection of the increasing focus on military‑patriotic 
youth training in the Brezhnev era, strongly endorsed by the Komsomol.21 
membership of the Komsomol was expected for schoolchildren and students 
aged from 14 to 28 who became members of a primary cell, the bottom layer of a 
complex hierarchy of management mirroring the Communist Party organization.22 
nikolai mitrokhin suggests that Komsomol activities centred around the war cult 
were highly controlled by nationalist sympathizers and encouraged by novels and 
memoirs about the war.23 Furthermore, young people were taken to visit war sites and 
monuments as part of their moral upbringing (vospitanie).24 novorossiisk teenagers 
were possibly even more exposed to memory of the war than many of their peers. 
According to a former member of the Shkhuna rovesnikov, the young post‑war 
generation of novorossiisk was regaled with stories of wartime exploits recounted 
by their fathers and grandfathers.25 moreover, it is claimed that the Shkhunatiki 
would routinely ind grenades, shell‑cases and human remains, breeding a feeling 
of involvement in war memory from childhood and a sense of identiication with 
the young partisans who had fought outside novorossiisk during the war.26 
18. Konstantin Podyma, Schastlivogo plavaniia, “Shkhuna Rovesnikov”! [Happy sailing, 
“Shkhuna Rovesnikov”!], (m.: Detskaia literatura, 1975), 5.
19. Ibid., 6.
20. Raisa Sokolova, Beskozyrka (novorossiisk: Departament kul´tury Krasnodarskogo kraia, 
c. 2005), 8‑9. 
21. See Jonathan Brunstedt, “Building a Pan‑Soviet Past: The Soviet War Cult and the Turn 
Away from ethnic Particularism,” Soviet and Post‑Soviet Review, 38, (2011): 149‑171, 163.
22. A. Yurchak, everything was Forever until it was no more: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), Chapter 3.
23. nikolai mitrokhin, Russkaia partiia: dvizhenie russkikh natsionalistov v SSSR, 1953‑1985 
gody  [The Russian Party: The Russian nationalists’ movement in the USSR, 1953‑1985] (m.: 
novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2003), 114‑116; 277.
24. Brunstedt, “Building a Pan‑Soviet Past,” 164‑166.
25. F6H, a former Shkhunatik (interview 05/02/2013).
26. Konstantin Podyma (05/02/2013).
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Although the Shkhunatiki may in retrospect consider themselves to have 
been eccentric and atypical of their generation,27 they were probably rather the 
product of their times and cultural environment, with relatively normal family 
backgrounds including peasants, accountants, workers in the port, doctors and 
managers in industry.28 Indeed, according to Gleb Tsipursky’s analysis, most of 
the readers of Komsomol´skaia Pravda in the early 1960s represented “conformist 
youth,” who identiied with the values propagated by the newspaper, including 
the strong sense of patriotism disseminated from above.29 However, Podyma and 
two female Shkhunatiki categorically dismiss suggestions of direct Komsomol 
inluence on the original Beskozyrka ceremony,30 although it is possible that the 
overwhelming state propaganda machine of their youth went largely unnoticed due 
to its ubiquitous nature. They do, however, acknowledge Party support from the 
editor of novorossiiskii rabochii, a member of the gorkom, the town committee of 
the Communist Party, who provided premises for their meetings and encouraged 
the already independent youngsters to organize the ceremony themselves, while 
nonetheless checking on the organizational details.31 
F6H claims that it took time for the authorities to come to terms with the group’s 
sometimes unusual projects, although Podyma believes that the Komsomol was 
unwilling to help because of the absence of prestigious veterans from the irst 
ceremony. On the other hand, Podyma does allege that there was some peripheral 
involvement from the KGB (the state security service), whose border guards set 
up searchlights along the shore to light up their proceedings,32 a claim disputed by 
F6H. In the light of competing claims and lack of decisive evidence, it is dificult to 
gauge with certainty the degree of inluence from above. This grassroots movement 
was no doubt considerably inluenced by political ideology and the national 
memorial climate, albeit with scope for initiative and inventiveness coming directly 
from the younger generation. 
Involving only twenty‑two young people and six adults at irst, the newly 
invented ritual of Beskozyrka faltered for a time, being banned by a Communist 
Party bureaucrat in 1969,33 despite its patriotic intent. Party concern may have 
been due to a degree of nervousness about potential crowds of young people 
gathering together after the protest events in moscow against the invasion of 
27. F6H considers them to have been “angular rather than curved” (email 15/09/2013).
28. F6H.
29. Gleb Tsipursky, “Conformism and Agency: model Young Communists and the Komsomol 
Press in the Later Khrushchev Years,” europe‑Asia Studies, 7, (2013):1396‑1416.
30. F6H and F7e (05/02/2013).
31. See Podyma, « Vechnyi ogon´ »: ty gori, ne sgorai… , 2008, 19; and “Mify – ne rify, no 
v farvatere ‘Beskozyrki’ – ni k chemu! [myths are not reefs, but for Beskozyrka there are 
no smooth waters!],” novorossiiskie izvestiia (16 Feb. 2011), http://novodar.ru/index.php/
novohistory‑punkt/2148‑mnrnvfbnkch‑02‑2011 [accessed 21/12/2011]. Parents of some 
marchers also worked for the Communist Party (Podyma and F7e).
32. “mify – ne rify” novorossiiskie izvestiia.
33. Ibid.
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Czechoslovakia in 1968 as, although the ceremony was permitted oficially in 
1970, it was restricted to a much smaller area.34 Following the intervention of 
inluential veterans and the gorkom, local Komsomol oficials were apparently 
inally convinced of the value of the ceremony and gave it their approval in 
1971,35 such that, by the outing of the third Beskozyrka, the number of participants 
had increased dramatically to ive thousand, and by 1973 the press was already 
referring to it as an established tradition.36 
The rise in popularity of the Beskozyrka ritual during the 1970s mirrored the 
development of the war cult nationwide, when popular memory of the war was 
very much inluenced by television and radio programmes.37 Similarly, war ilms 
and novels remained popular, uniting the people’s taste with state propaganda.38 
Denis Kozlov attributes a nationwide manifestation of an interest in history 
to the fact that it was a more “culturally acceptable” subject of discussion in 
Soviet society than internal or external politics, which invariably strayed into 
the realm of uncertainty.39 This may have been true for the politically conscious 
intelligentsia, but the ordinary citizen could also identify with the courage 
shown and death toll in the war. In novorossiisk, memory of the war was further 
promoted in 1973 when the town was made a Hero‑City of the Soviet Union due 
to the malaia zemlia campaign; with his vested interest in the town, Brezhnev 
himself came to make the oficial award in 1974. According to Hedrick Smith, a 
Western journalist based in moscow, by the end of the 1970s Soviet cultural life 
had become “saturated with the war theme.”40 
The early Beskozyrka tradition was apparently welcomed by both young 
and old, fusing the patriotic commemoration desired by the older generation 
with the romance of a secret society attractive to its young inventors. Sokolov 
recalls the emotion evoked by the ceremony as veterans silently remembered 
their fallen comrades, linked with their gratitude for the opportunity to pass on 
this memory to the younger generation.41 The involvement of veterans in moral 
34. Ibid.; and Konstantin Podyma, “Beskozyrka”: Cherez gody i stoletiia: Dokumental´naia 
povest´ [“Beskozyrka”: After Years and Centuries] (novorossiisk – m.: 2008), 41‑2.
35. “mify – ne rify,” novorossiiskie izvestiia.
36. Podyma, “Beskozyrka,” 2008, 41 and 47; and “Plyvi, beskozyrka [Float, Beskozyrka],” 
novorossiiskii rabochii (7 Feb.1973), 3.
37. Particularly Ot vsei dushi [From all my Heart] (see Kristin Roth‑ey, moscow Prime Time: 
How the Soviet Union Built the media empire that Lost the Cultural Cold War (Ithaca, nY – 
London: Cornell University Press, 2011), 275‑277; and the radio programme V etot den´ 30 let 
nazad [Thirty Years Ago Today], see http://www.tvmuseum.ru [accessed 01/05/2013].
38. William Tompson, The Soviet Union under Brezhnev (Harlow: Pearson education, 
2003), 102.
39. Denis Kozlov, “The Historical Turn in Late Soviet Culture: Retrospectivism, 
Factography, Doubt, 1953‑91,” Kritika: explorations in Russian and eurasian History, 2, 
(2001): 577‑600, 599.
40. Hedrick Smith, The Russians (new York: Quadrangle and The new York Times Book 
Company, 1976), 316.
41. Sokolov, my s maloi zemli, 367‑368.
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education of the younger generation was then and remains today a key aspect of 
patriotic upbringing. In contrast, the main aspect of Beskozyrka enjoyed by the 
younger generation was the night‑time torchlit procession with the secrecy of a 
complex system of passwords, an adventure in keeping with the romantic leanings 
of the Shkhunatiki, nurtured by the state emphasis on “romantic militarism,”42 
exempliied by the publication of a series of biographies of romantic igures in 
history, Plamennye revoliutsionery [Fiery Revolutionaries].43 Furthermore, the 
system of ranks and the military parade of Beskozyrka relected oficial war 
cult values, which promoted a convergence of generations that would ensure the 
ceremony’s success. 
A Changing Tradition or a Tradition of Change?
The juxtaposition of the concept of longstanding tradition with a relatively young 
state such as post‑Soviet Russia may seem paradoxical, particularly bearing in 
mind the unsettled years of perestroika and the 1990s, when values were being 
re‑assessed and Beskozyrka struggled to survive. Hobsbawm contends that newly 
invented traditions may be more widespread during periods of rapid social change 
and modernization to which older established traditions may succumb.44 On the 
other hand, it may be argued that the comfort of any tradition, however young, is 
particularly welcome within an environment rendered unstable by war, political 
or inancial crisis. According to Edward Shils, it is the very normativeness of 
tradition which acts as “the inertial force which holds society in a given form 
over time.”45 Similarly, Paul Connnerton sees the importance of ritual mainly in 
its invariance over time, as it relies increasingly on “habit‑memory,”46 a response 
acquired over the years. Halbwachs conirms that rituals tend to remain constant 
over time, even when society as a whole is in the process of change, as, especially 
in these circumstances, people tend to cling to tradition for the perceived security 
it offers,47 a position endorsed by Hobsbawm, who observes that society normally 
42. Brunstedt, “Building a Pan‑Soviet Past,” 163.
43. The state‑sponsored series was published from 1964 to 1990; see Polly Jones, “The Fire 
Burns On? The Fiery Revolutionaries Biographical Series and the Rethinking of Propaganda 
in the early Brezhnev era”, Slavic Review (forthcoming). The original crew were not only 
inventors of patriotic tradition, but also a literary society relishing war poetry, who notably paid 
homage to the romantic figure of poet Pavel Kogan, killed in the battle for novorossiisk: F6H 
and Konstantin Podyma, … chtob ikh ne zabyvali my: Dokumental´nye ocherki [So that We do 
not Forget Them] (novorossiisk — m.: 2009), 28.
44. eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” in eric Hobsbawm and Terence 
Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
1‑14.
45. edward Shils, Tradition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 25.
46. Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 23.
47. Halbwachs, On Collective memory.
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preserves continuity by resisting change, unless it is introduced very gradually 
from above.48 
On the other hand, any inertia associated with a tradition, even one strongly 
linked with local identity, risks leading to stagnation, as evidenced by the political 
environment of the Brezhnev era. There is the concomitant risk that the ritual may 
become static and boring, with over‑reliance on “habit‑memory” leading to popular 
apathy rather than a proactive commitment to remember. However, my evidence 
suggests that, in the context of widespread external change, a society may adapt 
an old tradition for new conditions by grafting new rituals or language onto the 
original ceremony of commemoration. It is perhaps not surprising that an analysis 
of the development of the Beskozyrka tradition over time reveals gradual changes 
in the ritual which deine each successive generation and serve to prevent potential 
mnemonic stagnation. 
Accepting, unlike Connerton, that traditions may change gradually, Shils 
concludes that, despite this, the essential elements should remain recognizable 
during the process of transmission across generations.49 Jan Assmann goes even 
further, arguing that change in traditions is unavoidable.50 He contends that, as 
communicative memory transmitted orally spans a maximum of three or four 
generations, there must inevitably be some dilution of permanency with the 
passing of time. Shils, similarly, argues that traditions have an inbuilt life‑span, 
although the relative inertia inherent in his model of propagation seems to argue 
against sudden inventions or changes in tradition. To survive for over four 
decades, however, particularly during the social and political consequences 
of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Beskozyrka tradition has needed 
to incorporate change. If necessity is the mother of invention, this has led the 
organizers of Beskozyrka to adopt a process of re‑invention and rejuvenation, 
enabling each generation to place its own stamp on the ritual, while serving to 
prevent mnemonic stagnation and promote local identity. It will be demonstrated 
that the series of changes in Beskozyrka has been established not merely as the 
passive response typical of a comfortably apathetic society, but in a proactive 
attempt to attract young people and propagate war memory across the generations. 
Furthermore, in view of the scale and frequency of these innovations, it may even 
be argued that the concept of change in the Beskozyrka ritual has become an 
invented tradition in its own right.
48. eric J. Hobsbawm, “The Social Function of the Past,” Past Present, 55, (1972): 3‑17.
49. Shils, Tradition.
50. Jan Assmann, “Collective memory and Cultural Identity,” new German Critique, 65, 
(1995): 125‑133, 128.
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The Unknown Sailor, novorossiisk. Photograph Vicky Davis, 10/05/2010
minor changes to the ceremony included a variation in the route in the 1970s, 
to take in the monument to the Unknown Sailor, the ribbons of his beskozyrka 
lowing prominently behind his head. With even younger children and their 
parents in mind, the time was brought forward irstly to the afternoon and then 
the evening of 3rd February, better facilitating cross‑generational transmission. 
Raisa mikhailovna Sokolova, archivist of the novorossiisk museum, describes the 
addition of a solemn oath to the proceedings in 1978, the tenth anniversary of 
the tradition and the week during which Brezhnev’s memoirs were published.51 
Repeating the oath made by major Tsezar´ L´vovich Kunikov’s troops prior to 
battle, the young people swore to become a living memorial to those who had given 
their lives. The original marine infantry had sworn to die for their country:
В  ,     ,   ,     
  ,  ,   ! 52
51. Sokolova, Beskozyrka, 16‑17.  
52. “We will give up our own will, strength and blood, drop by drop, for the life and happiness 
of the people, for you, our beloved motherland.” Sokolova, Beskozyrka, 16; and Sokolov, 
malaia zemlia, 10. 
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Furthermore, their historic success was reinforced in a dispatch from the War Council:
В  ,      , , 
  .  ,        
       , 
,   . 53
The heroes of malaia zemlia were thus situated in a mythical historical continuum, 
charged with ensuring the freedom of their children, the generation responsible for 
the invention of the Beskozyrka tradition. 
In contrast, the oath made by the Beskozyrka carriers in 1980 principally relected 
the prevailing ideology of the Brezhnev era, as participants vowed to strive to work 
hard to fulil Communist ideals, including the stringent economic demands of the 
tenth ive‑year plan.54 It is perhaps not surprising that, in a ceremony with links to 
the General Secretary’s wartime service, political ideology further complicated 
simple memory. Despite an ostensible wish to commemorate the past, this pragmatic 
consideration of the political environment, present and future, demonstrates that, 
towards the end of the Brezhnev era, national concerns barely connected with war 
memory had superseded the location‑speciic myth of Malaia zemlia. 
In the early years after the fall of the Soviet Union, interest in Beskozyrka waned 
in line with national trends after Gorbachev had dismantled the Brezhnev era war 
cult and the struggle with the economy took over.55 newspaper reports of the ritual 
are scarce and several of my respondents mentioned that Beskozyrka in its original 
form barely survived,56 with one member of the Shkhuna rovesnikov blaming the 
decline on the end of the Komsomol organization,57 which had apparently continued 
to endorse the ceremony since 1971. However, a retired headmistress recalls that 
one hundred children from each of the local schools were invited during the 1990s 
to the town’s theatre for a different type of commemoration involving about 5,000 
annually,58 reinforcing the claim that the town’s head of culture and other founding 
53. “Your fathers, mothers, wives and children will be proud of your defence, courage and 
heroism. We know that this small area of land will become great and will bring about the 
liberation of our fathers, mothers, wives and children groaning under the fascist yoke.” 
Sokolov, malaia zemlia, 8.
54. Leaflet held in the archives of novorossiiskii istoricheskii muzei‑zapovednik: “Operatsiia 
‘Beskozyrka‑80’,” mA 15049, novorossiiskoe PPO, zak. no. 334 (21/01/1980). 
55. Catherine merridale, “War, Death and Remembrance in Soviet Russia,” in Jay Winter and 
emmanuel Sivan, eds., War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 61‑83, 79. Stephen Lovell considers that “war was not central to 
Gorbachev´s self‑understanding as it had been for his predecessors.” (Stephen Lovell, The Shadow 
of War: Russia and the USSR, 1941 to the Present (Chichester: Wiley‑Blackwell, 2010), 9‑10.)
56. For example, m9A (07/05/2010), in charge of other rituals of remembrance; m5F 
(29/03/2011), a senior lecturer; and F3A, a teacher (10/05/2010). The local press makes no 




members of the ceremony kept the ritual alive.59 This is plausible, since, following 
the town council’s decision to take over responsibility for the ritual, it was back to 
full strength in 1998 for its thirtieth anniversary,60 when a further innovation was 
introduced. Recalling the fact that two landings had actually taken place in 1943, 
two torches were lit and two hats carried to beaches: the irst to Malaia zemlia in the 
usual fashion, and the second transported by tank to the site of the failed landings 
at Iuzhnaia Ozereika, where the ritual has evolved slightly differently, with its own 
committed following.61 
Beskozyrka at the eternal Flame on Heroes’ Square.  
Photograph Vicky Davis, 03/02/2013
The twenty‑irst century has seen a partial return under President Putin to 
more conservative Soviet values, a renewed emphasis on vospitanie and the 
development of a new war cult.62 Once again, politicians promote a common 
59. F7e.
60. “… Beskozyrka na volne [Beskozyrka on the Waves],” novorossiiskii rabochii (4 Feb. 
1998), 1.
61. According to the manager of a local veterans´ council (19/03/2011).
62. The Putin era war cult has been well documented in, for example, Jutta Scherrer, 
“Sowjetunion/Rußland: Siegesmythos versus Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung [The Soviet 
Union/Russia: The Victory myth versus a Reappraisal of the Past],” in monika Flacke, ed., 
mythen der nationen, volume 2. 1945: Arena der erinnerung [national myths, Volume 
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interest in social coherence and continuity with the Soviet past, presenting the 
people with the image of a strong and united nation. It is notable that Putin admits 
to “a clear respect, even nostalgia” for the past,63 a phenomenon well documented 
in Russia as a whole, particularly on the part of the older generation.64 It seems 
that the involvement of the younger generation is central to current policy for the 
propagation of war memory, utilizing many of the strategies of the Brezhnev era, 
for example visits to schools by veterans and young people standing on military 
guard at monuments. 
The majority of Russians of all ages welcomes the associated ceremonies 
and ritual reminiscent of the Brezhnev era, particularly Victory Day in may.65 
However the notoriously cold weather in February provides a ready‑made excuse 
for inhabitants of novorossiisk to stay indoors and not attend Beskozyrka. 
Some respondents search for further reasons for non‑attendance, explaining 
how they would like to join in the procession, but would ind it dificult to get 
there in the rush‑hour trafic; moreover, they claim that their children are tired 
after school.66 Possibly with this in mind, the organizers introduced in 2010 a 
newly invented offshoot of Beskozyrka, “Svecha v okne” the “candle in the 
window” movement, whereby those staying at home are encouraged to show 
their solidarity with the marchers outside by lighting a candle to place in the 
window as they pass by. Heavily promoted by the town council on posters and in 
newspaper advertisements, this modern idea is reminiscent of other ceremonies 
of remembrance worldwide. This new supplementary invented tradition is 
2, 1945: The Field of memory] (mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern, 2004), 619‑657; I.  Kurilla, “The Symbolic Politics of the Putin Administration,” in Philipp Casula and 
Jeronim Perovic, eds., Identities and Politics during the Putin Presidency (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 
2009), 255‑269; Lovell, The Shadow of War; Ivo mijnssen, “The Victory myth and Russia´s 
Identity”, Russian Analytical Digest, 72, (2010): 6‑9; Lisa Kirschenbaum, “World War II 
in Soviet and Post‑Soviet memory,” Soviet and Post‑Soviet Review, 38, (2011): 97‑103; N.E.  Koposov, Pamiat´ strogogo rezhima: istoriia politika v Rossii [memory of a Strict 
Regime: The History of Politics in Russia] (m.: novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2011); and 
Olga Kucherenko, “That´ll Teach´em to Love Their motherland!: Russian Youth Revisit 
the Battles of World War II,” The Journal of Power Institutions in Post‑Soviet Societies, 
12, (2011).
63. edwin Bacon and mark Sandle, “Brezhnev Reconsidered,” in edwin Bacon and mark 
Sandle, eds., Brezhnev Reconsidered (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 203‑217, 206. 
64. For example: Svetlana Boym, “From the Russian Soul to Post‑Communist nostalgia,” 
Representations, 49, (1995): 133‑166; Svetlana Boym, The Future of nostalgia (new York: 
BasicBooks, 2001); maya nadkarni and Olga Shevchenko, “The Politics of nostalgia: A 
Case for Comparative Analysis of Post‑Socialist practices,” Ab Imperio, 2, (2004): 487‑519; 
Svetlana Boym, “nostalgia and its Discontents,” Hedgehog Review, 9, (2007): 7‑18; and Serguei A.  Oushakine, “We´re Nostalgic but We´re not Crazy: Retrofitting the Past in 
Russia,” The Russian Review, 66, (2007): 451‑482.
65. Stephen m. norris, “memory for Sale: Victory Day 2010 and Russian Remembrance,” 
Soviet and Post‑Soviet Review, 38, (2011): 201‑229; and Elizabeth A. Wood, “Performing 
memory: Vladimir Putin and the Celebration of World War II in Russia,” Soviet and 
Post‑Soviet Review, 38, (2011): 172‑200.
66. notably m3e (22/03/2011), F4F (18/03/2011), F4H (16/03/2011) and F4I (17/03/2011).
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particularly popular amongst women not wishing to venture outdoors,67 and 
involves far more people than ever before, even if they do not demonstrate 
the commitment of those taking part in the cold. An innovation grafted onto 
an older, established tradition, it has the effect of enriching, rejuvenating and 
refreshing the ritual, rendering it more attractive to the younger generation and 
their parents. Furthermore, a new daytime Beskozyrka especially for children 
was introduced in 2013, attracting a further audience of 4,700 young people,68 a 
cohort of citizens not able to deploy excuses when taken to the ceremony by their 
teachers, with their families responding to a complex mixture of expectation and 
freedom to attend.
The highlight of 2011 was a reconstruction of the landings at malaia 
zemlia, repeated annually since then. Such events have become very popular 
globally, including in Russia, where the annual reconstruction of the Battle 
of Borodino attracts large crowds.69 Whereas the older generation still recalls 
the more recent Soviet past, living memory of the war itself is on the brink 
of extinction. Perhaps for this reason, war memory in Russia often refers to 
ubiquitous heroism rather than to the more speciic examples still cited in the 
1990s.70 On the other hand, there is considerable local geographical detail in the 
reconstructions, which bring to life the generalisms of the national war myth 
with some historical accuracy.
A re‑enactment on the actual battle site can be a very powerful means of 
propagating collective memory, while still representing a relatively passive 
experience for the large audience. In contrast, the more intimate group in Iuzhnaia 
Ozereika witnessed a different spectacle in 2011. In a seemingly spontaneous 
gesture, the young beskozyrka bearer attracted gasps of admiration from spectators 
as he strode into the sea up to his shoulders to deposit the hat on the waves.71 An 
exchange of messages in an online forum established that he had gone into the water 
of his own accord, in a sudden surge of empathy with the original landing troops, 
and with no orders from above.72 In the light of this personal tribute in braving the 
winter waves, it appears that the romanticism of the young founders of Beskozyrka 
67. For example F2A (14/05/2010), F3F (16/03/2011), F3I (18/03/2011), F5n (02/04/2011) 
and F6F (15/03/2011).
68. Oksana mashkarova, “Vakhtu pamiati budut nesti i deti [Children will also Hold a memorial 
Ceremony],” novorossiiskii rabochii (18 Jan. 2013), 2; Lina Gritsenko, “Detiam pokazali, kto 
nastoiashchii supergeroi [Children were Shown who is a Real Superhero],” novorossiiskii 
rabochii (5 Feb. 2013), 2; and interview with Deputy mayor natal´ia Vladimirovna maiorova 
(04/02/2013).
69. See Julie Buckler, “Taking and Retaking the Field: Borodino as a Site of Collective Memory,” in Julie Buckler and Emily D. Johnson, eds., Rites of Place: Public Commemo‑
ration in Russia and eastern europe, (evanston, IL: northwestern University Press, 2013), 
203‑223, 218.
70. norris, “memory for Sale,” 217.
71. Ol´ga Gailesh, “novorossiisk ‘Beskozyrka 2011’,” munitsipal´naia novostnaia lenta (4 Feb. 2011), http://www.nrnews.ru/news/?id=42581 [accessed 09/02/2011].
72. Ibid.: online responses.
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lives on, at least in Iuzhnaia Ozereika,73 where there remains some scope on the 
fringe for the individual in organized remembrance today. However, this originally 
spontaneous part of the ceremony has now been incorporated into the main ritual 
at malaia zemlia, an indication perhaps of the increasingly centralized control of 
Beskozyrka, both administratively in the organization by the town council, and 
physically in the ranks of Cossacks holding the spectators at bay. Such top‑down 
intervention has prompted some negative comments in online discussions from 
citizens about over‑organization and the desecration of genuine memory for the 
sake of political utility.74 
The Beskozyrka bearer laying the hat and the wreath in the sea (03/02/2013).  
Photograph Anatolii Pozdniakov75
What started out as a series of sometimes minor innovations and reinements to the 
invented tradition of Beskozyrka has become a tradition of invented change in its 
own right, enabling each generation to take ownership of the ritual. even in 2012, 
more changes were still being promised: 
73. Although the lack of romanticism in most modern youngsters is bemoaned by G.A.  Krympokha in “Proshchaite, Galina Alekseevna [Farewell, Galina Alekseevna],” 
novorossiiskii rabochii (22 Aug. 2011), http://www.novorab.ru/ArticleSection/Details/3658 
[accessed 02/09/2011].
74. Online responses to Gailesh, “novorossiisk ‘Beskozyrka 2011’,” munitsipal´naia 
novostnaia lenta.
75. Photograph by Anatolii Pozdniakov, copyright of the photographer and reproduced with 
his permission.
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Despite the innovations, there is comfort in the continuity of symbolism in the 
Beskozyrka tradition. With candles, caps and ribbons, its interpretation and 
essence remain constant, although the consistency of symbolism permits only one 
interpretation of the past, in accord with the conventions of the war myth, albeit 
widely endorsed by the local population. Beskozyrka still appeals to the same 
members of society: the conservative middle classes, teachers, cadets and veterans, 
although the irst actors would hardly recognize the scale of today’s operation and 
the veterans are becoming fewer. 
With the participation of schools, the interest of parents is guaranteed. Here 
is an example of the harnessing of children to effect what I term the “reverse 
propagation” of memory, with some young families new to novorossiisk learning 
about Beskozyrka and coming to appreciate local history thanks to their children.77 
As in the case of the original inventors, the memory “message,” with its traditional 
symbolism, is still being transmitted back in new ways to the older generation by the 
youngest, complementing and reinforcing the traditional propagation mechanism 
from older to younger generations. 
In contrast, responsibility for the Beskozyrka ritual, founded by and traditionally 
associated with the young people of novorossiisk, was taken over in 1999 by the 
regional youth committee, this time involving a committee for youth rather than 
the younger generation themselves, who thereby appear to have lost their original 
ownership of the ceremony. The following year, Beskozyrka became known as 
a pan‑Russian operation,78 its name today emphasizing its roots: “Vserossiiskaia 
molodëzhnaia patrioticheskaia aktsiia ‘Beskozyrka’” [The pan‑Russian patriotic 
youth movement “Beskozyrka”]. Despite the implicit geographical expansion, 
attendees are largely local, with the inancial burden of the ceremony falling 
on the town of novorossiisk, whose mayor now takes responsibility for its 
implementation, possibly relecting some local rivalry over the ownership 
of memory between the hero‑city of novorossiisk and the regional centre of 
Krasnodar. The 2011 advertising pamphlet, published by the region, conirms the 
continued emphasis on youth participation, although there is no mention of its 
young founders and their vision, indicating perhaps that the authorities are anxious 
to take all the credit. 
76. “From year to year the movement [...] does not change, but on each occasion the 
programme acquires new memorial components. This year will be no exception.” evgeniia 
Simanovich, “‘Svechu v okne’ mozhet zazhech´ kazhdyi [everybody can Light a Candle 
in the Window],” novorossiiskii rabochii (23 Jan. 2012), http://www.novorab.ru/ [accessed 
23/01/2012].
77. For example F3C (15/03/2011), m3F (16/03/2011) and F4L (05/02/2013).
78. Sokolova, Beskozyrka, 17‑19.
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Despite this omission, Podyma, a proliic inventor of tradition both in 
novorossiisk and moscow, has numerous publications on Beskozyrka and 
other less well‑known memorial rituals to his credit.79 For over forty years he 
consistently propagated the myth of malaia zemlia, building up a legend around 
the Shkhuna rovesnikov, which, he claims, spread from novorossiisk to other 
“outposts” around the Soviet Union.80 At the same time he nurtured his own 
personality cult as its “romantic” founder and only true guardian of memory.81 
In novorossiisk Podyma’s name has become just as recognized as those of the 
real heroes of malaia zemlia. While children learn about the history of Kunikov 
and his landing troops,82 older interviewees are equally likely to speak about the 
propagation of memory through Podyma’s Beskozyrka ritual,83 which has also 
been assimilated into the local history of the town, albeit a generation younger 
than the war itself.
moral education of the young is once again valued, inculcated in schools 
thanks to the new emphasis on patriotism, a topic now included in the school 
curriculum, which is dictated by the state and implemented through the regions.84 
Apparently this is endorsed by some parents and grandparents,85 who appreciated 
such behavioural instruction in the Pioneer and Komsomol organizations of 
their youth and welcome it now for their own children and grandchildren.86 
The mnemonic vicious circle may have been broken through the tradition of 
change, but Soviet society’s traditional values are increasingly being projected 
through ritual onto the younger Russian generation, subject today to domination 
and determination by the élite who now organize Beskozyrka, rather than the 
romantic young idealists of 1968. 
79. For a description of a ritual invented by Podyma in 1976 to commemorate those who 
died on the first night of the war in 1941, see Podyma, “Vechnyi ogon´”: ty gori, ne sgorai…, 5. Other works on memory by Podyma include: na volne pamiati [On the Waves of memory] 
(m. – novorossiisk: Sentiabr´, 2008); “Beskozyrka”: Cherez gody i stoletiia; and …chtob ikh 
ne zabyvali my: Dokumental´nye ocherki.
80. Podyma, “Vechnyi ogon´”: ty gori, ne sgorai…, 5.
81. Sokolova, Beskozyrka; and Professor Tamara Iurina, “Teleurok grazhdanstvennosti, 
posviashchennyi 40‑letiiu operatsii ‘Beskozyrka’ [Television Lesson on Citizenship: The 40th 
Anniversary of the ‘Beskozyrka’ movement]”, novaia Rossiia (3 Feb. 2008). Furthermore, 
15,000 documents await scholarly study in Podyma´s archive, RGASPI.
82. According to the history curriculum of School No. 6 and the Bekar School in Novorossiisk. 
Information is also propagated in local libraries. The pupils´ viewpoint was analysed from the 
results of a survey of schoolchildren of the Bekar School and School no. 6. 
83. A total of 65 out of 124 interviewees.
84. Patriotism is the new top topic of the Russian curriculum, according to the headteachers of School No. 6 (13/05/2010), School No. 19 (29/03/2011) and the Bekar School (06/05/2010). 
Furthermore, schools devote the whole month of February to patriotism, almost seamlessly 
linking history of the landings on 3rd February with national men´s day, “Den´ zashchitnika 
Otechestva,” on 23rd February.
85. A total of 21 respondents: 14 women and 7 men. 
86. One local library held an event in 2009 to celebrate the birth of the Komsomol, according to 
librarians F5J and F5K (23/03/2011).
120 VICKY DAVIS
Time and Tradition
Coniding her personal thoughts during remembrance ceremonies, a respondent 
relects: “I think behind my eyes: I try to imagine it, from ilms and books, how 
awful it was: explosions, how they lived. It must have been very hard.”87 This is 
a good example of trans‑temporal empathy promoted by a successful memorial 
ritual, whereby the imagination is converted into a time‑machine capable of 
linking two distant moments in time by the act of memory. Shils expresses 
well the notion of time‑travel through the imagination, considering tradition 
to be “the past in the present but as much part of the present as any very recent 
innovation.”88 The return to the past both culturally and mnemonically raises 
the question of the complex temporality of memory with respect to historical 
time: an imaginative memory may close the gap between past and present which 
exists thanks to the passage of historical time. A traditional society is typically 
brought together spatially by the annual rhythm of anniversaries, integrating 
it temporally with its common past by the temporary reduction of historical 
distance, thereby promoting understanding of past events and empathy with the 
people involved.
Personal identiication with the troops was also noticeable in discussions 
with younger male respondents about war ilms, demonstrating the “prosthetic 
memory” described by Alison Landsberg, which offers a mechanism “at the 
interface between a person and a historical narrative about the past” for the 
acquisition of powerful memories which were not actually experienced.89 This 
type of visual inluence is similarly possible during the Beskoyrka reconstructions, 
when a reversal of time is apparent on the very same space where the landings 
took place, reducing the perceived relative time gap between past and present with 
a concomitant increase in identiication between present‑day participants and the 
original troops. Those taking part in the ritual act as time‑travellers, approaching 
the malaia zemlia monument from the present, crossing the timeless space around 
it, to arrive in the past via the Brezhnev era as they reach the monument itself. 
Thus the monument in the shape of the prow of a launch, erected in 1982, seems 
transformed back into the original craft it represents, while its sculpted depictions 
of the original 1943 landing troops are transformed by the ritual into the ranks 
of the modern soldiers reconstructing the landings. The static monument and the 
memory it channels may have outlived the heroes, but still transmit the timeless 
testimony of non‑contestable patriotic heroism appreciated by all stake‑holders in 
the Beskozyrka ritual.
87. F4G (15/03/2011).
88. Shils, Tradition, 13.
89. Alison Landsberg, “Prosthetic memory: Total Recall and Blade Runner,” in mike 
Featherstone, Roger Burrows, eds., Cyberspace/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk: Cultures of 
Technological embodiment (London: Sage, 1995), 175‑189, 2.
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malaia zemlia memorial. Photograph Vicky Davis, 02/04/2004
According to Sokolov, the beskozyrka loating on the water is carried by the same 
waves as in 1943, themselves depicted as insensitive carriers of memory of those 
who lost their lives: 
 , ,      .   
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Thus the sea itself is deemed to be an agent in the apparent closing of the temporal 
gap between 1943 and today. not only the waves recall the night, apparently. 
A classmate of Konstantin Podyma feels that nature as a whole sees the need to 
reproduce the conditions of 1943 in tribute to the troops.91 An aspect of the war 
myth expressed by respondents of all ages includes the legendary icy wind and 
stormy weather every year on the night of 3rd ‑ 4th February.92 Podyma himself 
stated on one of his recent visits to novorossiisk: 
   ,       
 – , ,    .93 
90. “They will never return, no, these lads will never return to shore. Only the senseless waves beat on the shore, remembering the past …” Sokolov, my s maloi zemli, 368.
91. F6F.
92. Sokolova, Beskozyrka, 14; interviewees include F2A, F4G, F4I, m5B (18/03/2011), F6F 
and F8C (05/05/2010).
93. “It is appointed by nature that it is always foul weather on 3rd February in novorossiisk, 
with wind, rain, and bitter cold which penetrates to the bones.” (“Fevral´skii poryv [February 
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In a masterpiece of understatement, novorossiiskii rabochii proclaims: 
В        ,   
.      .94 
Women, particularly, refer to wearing layers of clothes for the ceremony,95 with some 
men feeling that the freezing weather enables them better to empathize with the landing 
troops jumping into the icy water in the middle of the night.96 Podyma, describing in 
1975 the irst Beskozyrka seven years previously, emphasized the similarities: 
Ф    , .   ,    
… 97
Even the password on that night relected the prevalent winter wind in Novorossiisk: 
“nord ost” [north‑easterly]. In 2012, myth became reality, as hardy citizens turned 
out in unprecedented temperatures:98
       . ! 
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The Beskozyrka tradition, which was started on the 25th anniversary of the landings, 
also has its own anniversary timeline. One recent book, for instance, links the 
35th anniversary of the landings with the tenth anniversary of Beskozyrka itself, 
giving almost equal importance to both.100 A newspaper article in 2007 completely 
Storm]), novorossiiskii rabochii (29 Jan. 2011), 3.)
94. “On this day, tradition is religiously observed not only by citizens, but also by the weather. 
A warm wind never blows on 3rd February.” Viktoriia nikolaenko, “‘Beskozyrka’ vskolykhnula 
volny nashei pamiati [‘Beskozyrka’  Stirred up the Waves of our memory],” novorossiiskii 
rabochii (4 Feb. 2011), 1.
95. For example F3A, F3K (23/03/2011), F4G, F6D (09/05/2010), F7B (08/05/2010) and F7C 
(19/03/2011).
96. especially m3A (10/05/2010) and m5B.
97. “The February night was freezing and windy. Exactly the same as many years ago …” 
(Podyma, Schastlivogo plavaniia, “Shkhuna Rovesnikov”!, 67‑8).
98. F3A by personal email (04/02/2012).
99. “There is never good weather on 3rd February. never! But this year the temperature plunged 
even below yesterday´s ‑15C, with wind too, a change from the usual more tolerable ‑3C.” 
“V novorossiiske sostoialas´ sorok chetvërtaia operatsiia ‘Beskozyrka’ [The forty‑fourth 
‘Beskozyrka’ ceremony has taken place in novorossiisk],” novorossiiskii rabochii (3 Feb. 2012), http://www.nrnews.ru/news/?id=47939 [accessed 04/02/2012]. However prevalent the 
myth, it could not influence the unusually high temperatures of February 2013: “Tak zharko 
v nachale fevralia v krae bylo 30 let nazad [It was just as warm at the beginning of February 30 Years ago],” novorossiiskii rabochii (8 Feb. 2013), 2.
100. Sokolova, Beskozyrka, 15.
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misunderstands the dates, though, confusing the commemoration with the actual 
historical event, and stating that 2007 would see the 39th anniversary of the landings, 
rather than the 39th anniversary of Beskozyrka.101 It is tempting to infer that the 
journalist is a relatively young person, for whom the ixed temporal horizon of 
1968 seems just as far away as 1943, such that real time and mythical time have 
virtually converged. Certainly, it provides further evidence that, for some at least, 
the act of commemoration has become more signiicant than the distant event it 
commemorates, while also suggesting that memory of the malaia zemlia campaign 
in novorossiisk is indeed incomplete without the Beskozyrka tradition.
Beskozyrka also breaks the established temporal order in another way, eating 
into free time on a long February evening, when many families would prefer 
to be at home. Since 2010, even the private time of those not taking part in the 
procession outside has been invaded by ritualistic time thanks to the “candle in the 
window” movement, which also demands extra memorial space as the Beskozyrka 
ritual expands into people’s homes. There is no doubting the spatial and temporal 
expansion of Beskozyrka. What started out as a small‑scale evening event now 
takes up the whole of the 3rd February, and most of the previous day, as increasing 
numbers of delegates from other towns are invited to take part in an ever‑longer 
programme of events in a growing statement of local identity. 
The Turning of the Tide
Some scholars argue that the construction and propagation of collective war memory 
depends substantially upon performative ritual.102 On the other hand, Allan megill 
argues that there is no need for ritual commemoration in a society where direct, 
living memory remains strong.103 However, this argument ignores not only the 
comfort provided to the bereaved by repetition in a social context, but also the fact 
that often passive memory is reinforced by the more active process of ritualistic 
remembrance. Similarly, Pierre nora’s claim that modern society has effectively 
banished ritual is patently not applicable to war memory in Russia,104 being also 
robustly disputed by Jay Winter and emmanuel Sivan, who emphasize the fact that 
survivors of european wars still engage in collective acts of commemoration.105 
101. “Galina Krympokha prochitala lektsiiu o vysadke desanta na maluiu zemliu starsheklassnikam shkoly No. 30 [Galina Krympokha Spoke about the Malaia zemlia Landings to Senior Pupils at School No. 30],” munitsipal´naia novostnaia lenta (1 Feb. 2007), http://nrnews.ru/news/?id=2729 [accessed 2/9/2011].
102. See, for example, Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective memory and the making 
of Israeli national Tradition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
103. Allan megill, “History, memory, Identity,” History of the Human Sciences, 11 (1998): 37‑62.
104. Pierre nora, “Between memory and History: Les Lieux de mémoire,” Representations, 
26 (1989): 7‑24, 12.
105. Jay Winter, and emmanuel Sivan, “Introduction,” in Jay Winter and emmanuel Sivan, 
eds., War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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Serguei Oushakine has proposed that modern Russians are united in their 
collective memory by a “patriotism of despair” following the segregation 
and fragmentation brought about by the trauma of recent wars, especially 
in Afghanistan and Chechnia.106 Beskozyrka, however, is not rooted in the 
disillusionment of bereaved families; rather, in common with other rituals 
of commemoration of the Great Patriotic War,107 it demonstrates the sense of 
a debt on the part of the living to those who lost their lives in the landings, 
a sacriice which led to the eventual liberation of Novorossiisk from enemy 
occupation. In Russian social culture, the exact site of burial is a vital focus 
for socially prescribed mourning.108 In the case of soldiers lost at sea, with no 
obvious monument or grave for the bereaved family to visit, the simple sailor’s 
cap loating on the waves provides the only focal point for tributes of lowers 
and the expression of emotion. 
The original Beskozyrka ceremony also served to ill an ideological vacuum in 
the Soviet Union. Celebrations in February are not uncommon in other societies to 
alleviate the tedium and hardship of the long winter before the days lengthen and the 
signs of spring appear. In a blend of Christian and pagan tradition, many countries 
hold a carnival week at the beginning of February before the onset of the rigours 
of Lent, although the traditional Russian carnival maslenitsa was banned in Soviet 
times. Beskozyrka is neither joyous nor food‑orientated, but does involve those 
elements of lame and liturgy more often associated with church ritual. Similarly, 
the sailor’s hat is borne in procession and laid on the waves in an act resembling an 
offering to the memory of the landing troops. Reinforcing this interpretation, one 
respondent throws sweets and biscuits into the sea behind the hat and the wreaths, 
as her own small sacriice to the dead.109 
Candles are very often lit in a Russian Orthodox church in an act of memory 
and are carried by President Putin in oficial services of remembrance.110 With 
implicit religious symbolism, the new “candle in the window” movement now 
effectively brings the sacred memorial ritual into the secular home, using the 
symbolism of the candle to shed light on memory. The placing of the candle 
on a windowsill, visible from the outside, also breaches any remaining barriers 
between the collective and the private with respect to memory. The quasi‑religious 
symbolism of the liturgy and ritual of Beskozyrka is evident in the symbols of 
light and ire, the imagery of sacriice and martyrdom. Secular collective memory 
Press, 2000), 1‑5, 1.
106. Serguei Oushakine, The Patriotism of Despair: nation, War and Loss in Russia (Ithaca, 
nY – London: Cornell University Press, 2009).
107. For example, the custom in Russia to lay flowers to the war dead after a wedding.
108. Catherine merridale, “Russia,” in Glennys Howarth and Oliver Leaman, eds., 
encyclopedia of Death and Dying (London: Routledge, 2001), 390‑1.
109. F7C.
110. Catherine merridale, Ivan´s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939‑1945 (new 
York: Picador, 2006), 378.
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and organized religion have much in common, with memory perhaps becoming a 
“surrogate” religion or faith system.111 
Although few Soviet soldiers in the war were overt Christians, the Orthodox 
Church today is very close to the state, a situation accepted by veterans and encouraged 
by Putin, who ensures that priests pray for the war dead.112 The joint inluence of state 
and Church should aid in principle both the retention of collective memory and the 
inculcation of conservative moral values. However, most of my respondents did not 
feel the necessity for the presence of a priest at Beskozyrka, most viewing it as a 
purely secular occasion,113 despite the claim by local priest Father Georgii that 95% 
of the population of novorossiisk are Orthodox believers. On the other hand, Father 
Georgii considers his presence there to be vital. He has been invited by the mayor 
to attend in an oficial capacity for the last eight years, demonstrating the increasing 
importance of the Church in Russia both socially and politically. While wearing his 
own military medals, Father Georgii’s role remains largely symbolic, as he is not 
usually invited to speak, in contrast to his input on other memorial occasions.114 There 
is no doubt that religion does play a part in memory today, but, according to my 
evidence, that part is largely in the personal sphere. 
The need for individual personal remembrance and mourning is rarely 
acknowledged in top‑down, “invention of tradition” theory, but is recognized 
by Winter in his analysis of the process of remembrance as the response to 
bereavement.115 Issues of personal grief may no longer be applicable so long after the 
war, but individuals must still make a choice whether or not to attend a ritual, even if 
subject to group pressure. Connerton addresses this particular question in his study 
of how collective memory is transmitted and retained by social groups both large 
and small,116 concluding that the phenomenon of “habit‑memory” supplants any 
interpretative capacity of the individual. The evidence in novorossiisk, however, 
demonstrates a strong commitment by attendees to the ceremony in the face of 
often daunting weather conditions which serve only to strengthen the bond between 
those remembering and those remembered. most participants in the Beskozyrka 
tradition are not simply passive spectators, but are able to justify their presence, 
usually accepting some physical discomfort as an aid to their interpretation of the 
ritual. This may not always be true for those simply watching a reconstruction, but 
it remains the case for those making the longer journey to the beach at Iuzhnaia 
111. Barbara misztal, “Durkheim on Collective memory,” Journal of Classical Sociology, 3, 
2003: 123‑143, 139.
112. merridale, Ivan´s War, 378‑9.
113. Particularly male interviewees, who stressed the mixture of faiths and ethnicities of the 
original troops.
114. Interview with Father Georgii (14/03/2011).
115. J.M. Winter, Sites of memory, Sites of mourning: The Great War in european Cultural 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Winter interprets mourning practices 
as providing consolation through classical art, language and monuments within the traditional 
healing framework.
116. Connerton, How Societies Remember.
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Ozereika outside novorossiisk. Here, the genuinely involved younger participants 
are compared favourably with the original Shkhunatiki by Galina Krympokha, 
an Honoured Citizen of novorossiisk, who is credited with keeping the Shkhuna 
rovesnikov and its crew aloat over the long years since its inception117: “Tam net 
ravnodushnykh glaz” [there are no indifferent eyes there].118 
It is possible that the current wave of nostalgia for the Soviet Union plays a role 
in the popularity of rituals of remembrance dating back to the Brezhnev era.119 my 
observations, however, point rather to the importance of a sense of continuity with 
the past – not with the Soviet Union in general, but rather to a familial connection 
provoked by the strong feeling of empathy with the landing troops. many of my 
interviewees were able to point to their individual ancestors who had fought locally 
in the war, with respondents at both ends of the age spectrum claiming that they 
had inherited the hardy and heroic character of their forebears.120 It appears that 
older family members act as links in a memory chain which connects today’s 
citizens genetically with the landing troops. extrapolating from the individual 
to the community in general, the headmistress of School No.  6 observed that 
the heroism typical of wartime is transmitted through ritual, as if “caught” by the 
younger generation in the form of improved behaviour: “geroicheskoe iavlenie 
diktuet povedenie [an heroic occurrence dictates behaviour].”121 A local historian 
commented on this phenomenon, stating that “it is as if they drink it in their mothers’ 
milk.”122 For example, a former soldier believes that the town’s inhabitants “were 
born” from malaia zemlia,123 while a town councillor interprets memory as “our 
blood, our duty, future and past together.”124 Indeed, a young teacher sees war 
memory as part of the town’s “living organism,” whereby knowledge about malaia 
zemlia is “naturally” assimilated.125 Thus the propagation of memory is linked to 
the transmission of a belief and behaviour system. This sense of communal memory 
nurtured in the young is epitomized in the slogan ubiquitously found on school 
walls: “Pobeda deda moia pobeda” [my grandfather’s victory is my victory].
In contrast, evidence suggests that some young adults may have experienced 
enough of the Beskozyrka tradition following years of enforced participation 
as schoolchildren.126 However, the tradition is re‑fuelled with fresh blood as 
117. Tat´iana Staroverova, novorossiiskii rabochii (30 nov. 2010), http://www.novorab.ru/
ArticleSection/Details/1733 [accessed 02/09/2011].
118. “Fevral´skii poryv,” novorossiiskii rabochii.
119. See Fn 66.
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newcomers to the area seem keen to attend the ceremony,127 while locals bring 
friends from further aield to experience it at irst hand,128 attracted by the unique 
maritime connotations of the ritual.129 
It is clear that there remains a place today for traditional ritualistic ceremony in 
this modern, youth‑oriented society, despite the fact that an established tradition 
may be regarded as a sign of conservatism in a society, as it simply maintains 
the status quo. In novorossiisk evidence suggests that the combination of the 
new state‑sponsored war cult of the Putin era,130 with the inluence of the more 
reactionary, provincial older generations, is suficient to counteract the sometimes 
anti‑traditional attitude of young people.
Although currently larger than ever, the numbers attending Beskozyrka remain 
substantially smaller than those celebrating Victory Day in novorossiisk, mainly 
due to the different nature of the remembrance involved. As a celebration of 
national victory in 1945, Victory Day is less solemn than Beskozyrka. Citizens 
feel that Victory Day is a different type of event: national, happier and more 
celebratory, while Beskozyrka demands a more thoughtful approach to memory, 
which, according to many respondents, comes directly from the romantic soul of 
the young people of novorossiisk.131 
The continuing sense of identiication with Beskozyrka of the younger 
generation, with the gratitude and participation of many of their elders, maintains 
a sense of social cohesion that may easily have died out with other traditions during 
the 1990s. Furthermore, its original, speciically local interpretation endures, 
despite and also thanks to a series of changes, usually regarded as elements of 
creative enrichment of the ceremony and recently taking their inspiration from 
commemorative norms worldwide rather than a small local youth club. Shils 
may regard originality as the enemy of tradition,132 but, in novorossiisk, it has 
helped to avoid any dilution of meaning and has guaranteed the longstanding 
popularity of Beskozyrka, which is now at an all‑time high, with no sign of ritual 
fatigue. Indeed, oficial council igures state that 15,000 participants in 2011 
remembered the heroes of 1943,133 while igures for 2013 suggest that a record 
23,500 attended the ceremony, an indication of the growing popularity of the 
127. 8 out of the 12 relative newcomers to the town interviewed claimed that they take part in 
Beskozyrka.
128. According to F3e (16/03/2011).
129. For example, friends from other towns are invited by m4C (29/03/2011) and F7A.
130. See, among others, Brunstedt, “Building a Pan‑Soviet Past”; Kirschenbaum, “World War 
II in Soviet and Post‑Soviet memory”; norris, “memory for Sale”; and elizabeth A. Wood, 
“Performing memory.”
131. Voiced by several respondents, particularly F3I.
132. Shils, Tradition, 236.
133. “V novorossiiske proshla Vserossiiskaia vakhta pamiati ‘Beskozyrka‑2011’ [The 
Pan‑Russian memorial Ceremony ‘Beskozyrka‑2011’ Took Place in novorossiisk],’ 
Ofitsial´nyi sait administratsii i Dumy munitsipal´nogo obrazovaniia gorod‑geroi novorossiisk 
(4 Feb. 2011), http://www.admnvrsk.rujoo.admnvrsk.ru/index.php/2010‑02‑26‑12‑44‑41/427
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tradition.134 Although Beskozyrka remains a tradition reinforcing local identity, 
Podyma has claimed that visitors from 270 other towns have taken part over the 
years.135 In 2011, for example, delegates were invited from other hero‑cities to 
take part in a series of events and a ritual on a much larger scale, with coverage on 
the national television news conirming the status and identity of Novorossiisk 
nationwide.136 With the national focus in 2013 on the 70th anniversary of victory 
in Stalingrad,137 however, the only visiting delegation to novorossiisk was from 
the regional capital, Krasnodar. The considerable local and national media 
hype serves to convince many younger respondents that Beskozyrka is famous 
worldwide, such that they express naïve surprise that it remains unknown in 
Western europe.138 
For today’s ritual, it is the town council which bears the brunt of, and takes the 
credit for the organization of Beskozyrka. It is in this respect that responsibility 
for the propagation of memory has changed most signiicantly, with the 
original bottom‑up transmission of Beskozyrka by the younger generation now 
centralized and controlled by the local authorities, and the only remaining spark 
of individuality and spontaneity on the periphery now oficially incorporated into 
the oficial mainstream narrative at Malaia zemlia.
Young people in novorossiisk appear today to be less able or willing to 
use their own initiative in the ield of memory than in the Brezhnev era. What 
started as a rare example of a bottom‑up ritual in the Soviet Union, albeit under 
the not insigniicant inluence of the Brezhnev era war cult, has become more 
like the top‑down type of invented tradition described by Hobsbawm, with its 
emphasis on the propagation of social values through collective memory. With 
Russia going through a second cult of war memory under Putin, the Soviet 
emphasis on patriotism and moral education of the young are once again in 
evidence, affording national and local conditions under which this unique 
remembrance ritual is thriving and where increasing empathy with the landing 
troops is demonstrated. There may be a growing audience of schoolchildren 
to ensure its future propagation, but, nonetheless, the tradition would not last 
unless enjoying popular approval from the public as a whole, with the support 
7‑‑l‑2011r [accessed 09/02/2011]. This figure was revised upwards to nearer twenty thousand 
by the local press: Gailesh, “novorossiisk ‘Beskozyrka 2011’.”
134. Provisional figure from Deputy mayor natal´ia maiorova.
135. Podyma, “Beskozyrka,” 47. Podyma claims that, over the 45 years since its inception, 
350,000 people have taken part in the ceremony: Oksana mashkarova, “novorossiisk pomnit! 
[novorossiisk Remembers!],” novorossiiskii rabochii (05/02/2013), 1.
136. “”novosti [The news],” Pervyi kanal, 0900 (4 Feb. 2011), http://www.1tv.ru/newsvideoarchive/pd=04.02.2011 [accessed 08/07/2012].
137. This took place on 2nd February, while the Beskozyrka ceremony was on 3rd February 
2013.
138. See also reference to the alleged fame of the “Shkhuna rovesnikov” in its heyday 
throughout the Soviet Union: evgenii Lapin, “‘Shkhuna’ ne spuskaet parusa [´The Schooner´ is 
not lowering its sails],” novorossiiskii rabochii (8 nov. 2010), http://novorab.ru/ArticleSection/
Details/1509/24 [accessed 20/11/2011].
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of local and regional authorities. The proactive maintenance of this tradition 
with its regular re‑invention helps to deine the identity of the hero‑city of 
novorossiisk and ensures that the myth of malaia zemlia remains at the heart of 
the local community. 
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